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RECENT CASES

The effect of the decision in Hampton may be to hasten legislatures 0 into adopting entrapment statutes.61 The advantage of an
entrapment statute is that it "can organize and define the subject
of all entrapment without regard to the specific factual circumstances
that often restrict the generality of a judicial opinion."e2
The controversy concerning entrapment which began with the
Court's opinion in Sorrells is still prevelant today. Although it is generally agreed that "criminal activity is such that stealth and strat3
egy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer,'6
there is still dispute as to when stealth and strategy become the
"manufacturing of crime.
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Pursuant to court authorization, 1 federal officers made an unannounced forcible intrusion into Salvatore Agrusa's place of business, 2 while it was vacant and closed to the public. The federal officers entered for the purpose of installing an electronic surveillance
device. Upon termination of the court authorized surveillance,3 the
officers again forcibly entered the vacant premises, this time to remove the device. The evidence secured in this fashion was subsequently admitted at trial and aided in Agrusa's conviction for violation of the federal firearms statute. 4 On appeal, Agrusa contended
that "since the
60. The Court noted in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question
and adopt any substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable." Id. at 433.
61. Despite support from the commentators, only a few states have adopted the minority
approach. See Park, supra note 17, at 167n.3.
62.
,VORKING PAPERS, supra note 6, at 304.
63. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
64. Id.
electronic
surto
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government's
1. The
veillance was submitted to the Honorable Elno B. Hunter, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Missouri on February 28, 1974.
2. Agrusa operated an auto body shop in Independence, Missouri.
3. The authorization was issued by Judge Hunter the same day as applied for, February 28, 1974. The authorization was issued pursuant to Title III of the Onmibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971).
(1971), dealing in firearms without a license, however, is not
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1)
one of the offenses for which the court may authorize electronic interception of oral
communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1971). The application for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance was made stating that probable cause existed that Agrusa
Was, in fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 2315, and 371 (1971) for which 18 U.S.C. § 2516
authorized the admission of evidence obtained through court authorized electronic
(1971)
surveillance. The government obtained a supplemental order, required under 1S U.S.C. §
2517 (1971), which authorized the use of the intercepted communications before the grand
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that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for suppression
of the evidence acquired as a result of this unannounced breaking
and entering.5 In addressing a question of first instance, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the breaking
and entering, authorized by the United States District Court, to be
reasonable under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution7 and lawful under the applicable statute." United States v.
Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976).
The court in Agrusa examined the breaking and entering of Agrusa's place of business to determine whether it was within the scope
of the United States Constitution, and whether it was in compliance
with federal statutory law. The court examined the constitutional aspect first.
The fourth amendment to the Constitution imposes a standard of
reasonableness for lawful searches and seizures." That reasonableness requirement has been held to include the requirements of announcement and prior identification before forcible entry onto a premises can be made for the purpose of conducting a search and seizure.10
Recognized exceptions to the strict fourth amendment rule against unannounced police intrusion into private homes include:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officer's
authority and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified
in the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of
bodily harm, or (3) where those within, made aware of the
presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has
been a knock at the door), are then engaged in activity
which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or
the destruction of evidence is being attempted."
jury and at the trial in this case. The appellant did not raise any question of impropriety
concerning the supplemental order in his appeal. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690,
693

(8th Cir. 1976).

5. In his appeal, Agrusa alleged six points of reversible error at the trial court level.
The court, on appeal, found little reason to deal at any length with any of those contentions except the legality and constitutionality of the breaking and entering. United States
v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1976).

6. Senior Circuit Judge Van Oosterhaut wrote for a three judge panel consisting of
himself, and Circuit Judges Lay and Webster. Id. at 692.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides:
The right of the people to be secure In their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
8.

9.

18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971), provides:

The officer may break open any outer door or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or
when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution
of the warrant.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 257

(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969).

10.
11.

Commonwealth v. 'Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968).
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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These recognized exceptions, however, are not considered to be exhaustive of all possible future exceptions to an unannounced forcible
2
entry into a dwelling.1
The fourth amendment's announcement requirement has been
held to apply only to occupied dwellings; and non-dwellings and vacant premises have been held to be somewhat less protected under
that amendment's privacy guarantees.1 3
The leading case, to date, defining what constitutes a set of circumstances which warrants exception to the prior identificaion requirement is Ker v. California.14 Writing for the Supreme Court,
Justice Clark found the exigencies of potential evidence destruction
and possible knowledge of impending arrest compelling enough to
warrant a constitutional no-knock forcible entry of the Ker dwelling
place.1 5
Although there was no majority opinion in Ker, a majority of
justices did find the forcible entry of the Ker residence, without announcement, to have been reasonable, and within the boundaries of
the fourth amendment.In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan appealed to the sanctity of
a "man's castle" in pointing out that, barring qualification under the
three accepted exceptions to the announcement requirement,'7 the
forcible entry of the ker dwelling constituted unreasonable search
and seizure under the fourth amendment.18
The breaking and entering in Agrusa occurred in a vacant business place, rather than an inhabited dwelling. 19 The forcible entry was
made pursuant to court authorization, based on probable cause, and
in all other ways met the criteria prescribed by the federal wire tap

statutes .20
The exigencies found to be so uniquely present in Ker2 1 were also
present in Agrusa. 2 A prior announcement to Agrusa concerning the
intentions of the federal officers could only be self-defeating. The
evidence sought by the officers was the incriminating communica12. See United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10 (9th Cir. 1973).
13. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) ; United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp.
942 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
14. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
15. Id. at 40. Although entry was made by the use of a pass key, it was considered to ha
equivalent to a breaking for constitutional purposes. Id. at 38.
16. Justice Clark wrote for the Court, joined by Justices Black, Stewart, and
White. Justice Harlan concurred in the result.
17. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
18. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 680, 693 1Sth Cir. 1976). The Ker breaking and
entering was of an inhabited dwelling place and was not pursuant to a warrant. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 24-25 (1963).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1971) prescribes the procedure for interception of wire or oral
communications.
21. 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963).
22. 541 F.2d 690, 697 (8th Cir. 1976).
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tions Agrusa might have with possible accomplices; to require prior
announcement would be to invite destruction of that evidence. 3 Relying on Katz v. United States, 24 the court in Agrusa recognized that
no announcement of purpose was necessary for an otherwise authorized electronic surveillance. 25 Although Katz involved no breaking or
entering to install such a device, the difference between Katz and Agrusa was felt to be, for constitutional purposes, one of degree rather
26
than kind.
The court, in Agrusa, concluded that the authorized breaking and
entering of a vacant business premises pursuant to a court order,
for the purpose of installing an electronic surveillance device did not
run afoul of the fourth amendment shield against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 27 The exigencies of the situation, the type of
building entered, and the strict compliance with statutory procedure
were enough- to qualify the act under an exception to the prior
announcement requirement of the fourth amendment. 28
The court next directed its attention to whether forcible entry of
the premises in question was lawful under existing federal statutes.
The American common law seemed to require no announcement
prior to breaking into a non-dwelling for reasons of search.2 Historically, less protection against the invasion of privacy has been afforded vacant buildings, 30 and especially vacant business premises.3 1
Over three hundred seventy years ago, the first shadow of what was
to become the federal prior announcement statute 3 2 made its appearance.

In all cases when the King is [a] party, the sheriff (if the
doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to
arrest him, or to do other execution of the [King's] process, if. otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it,
he ought to signify the cause3 of his coming, and to make request to open [the] doors.
23. As the court stated in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463
usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect."
24. 389 U.S. 347, 355n.16 (1967).
25. 541 F.2d 690, 698 (8th Cir. 1976).

(1968):

"The

26. Id.

27. Id. at 697-98.
28. Id. As the Court recognized in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931) : "There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case Is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances." Id. at 857.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1972); Fields v.
United States, 855 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. Payne v. United States, 508 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
933 (1975) ; United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), vacating, 340 F. Supp.
454 (E.D. Pa. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).

31.

See United States v. Hassell, 336 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380

U.S. 965 (1965).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971).

38.

Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
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That the federal prior announcement statute represents the
modern codification of the common law development of rules pertaining to search and seizure seems fairly well settled.3 ' As such,
that statute is not to be read strictly and applied "woodenly, "33 for
any exception recognized under the common law pertaining to search
and seizure must be recognized under the statute which codifies it.s6
The Supreme Court, while recognizing the common law underpinnings of the federal prior announcement statute, has been slow in
recognizing the exigent circumstances which may justify noncompliance with the statute.3
In Sabbath v. United States5 ' the Court approached the conclusion that exigent circumstances may justify noncompliance, but only
in dictum.3
In Salvador v. United States"° the Eighth Circuit took notice of
the effect that exigent circumstances have on compliance with the
federal prior announcement statute."

The circumstances presented in Agrusa could possibly have justified noncompliance with the letter of the federal prior announcement
statute,' 2 since the exigencies were compelling. To notify Agrusa of
the agents' intentions prior to their surrepticious entry of his place
of business would serve to render that entry and subsequent electronic
surveillance a "useless gesture.'

3

The court, therefore, felt the ex-

igencies present at the time of the breaking and entering warranted
an exception to the prior announcement requirement of the federal
prior announcement statute."
The court's interpretations of the fourth amendment and the federal statute requiring prior announcement resulted in a very narrow
holding in Agrusa. The court in Agrusa held that
law enforcement officials may, pursuant to express court
authorization to do so, forcibly and without knock or announcement, break and enter business premises which are vacant at
34.

United States v.

Gervato, 340 F.

Supp. 454

(E.D. Pa. 1972).

See generally Sonnen-

reich & Ebner, No Knock and Nonsense, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. R1v. 626 (1970).
35. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 1976).
36. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
37. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 483-84 (1963) ; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
38. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
39. Id. at 591n.8. Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized, see Ker v. California, 347 U.S. 23, 47 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting), and there is little reason why those limited exceptions might
not also apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971), since they existed at common law, and the
statute is a codification of common law.
40. 505 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir. 1974).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971) may not, In fact, apply to vacant business premises, but
neither party raised the question of its applicability so the court assumed without deciding that it was controlling in this situation. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690,
699 (8th Cir. 1976).
43. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 310 (1958).
44. United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 701 (8th Cir. 1976).
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the time of entry, in order to install an electronic surveillance
device, provided the surveillance activity is itself pursuant to
court authorization, based on probable cause, and otherwise in
compliance with Title III. .... 45
Article 1, section 18 of the North Dakota Constitution4 6 is for
all practical purposes identical to the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution.4 7 In addition, section 18 and the statutes of the
State of North Dakota are subject to the reasonableness standard of
as applied to the states through the fourteenth
the fourth amendment
48
amendment.
The North Dakota Century Code includes two sections authorizing the issuance and carrying out of search warrants. 49 Section
29-29-08 is a general statute dealing with the issuance of all search
warrants,50 whereas section 19-03.1-32 wa's enacted in 1971 as a part
of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act. 51 The applicable statutes of
the North Dakota Century Code go one step further than the federal
prior announcement statute5 2 or the California statute 53 cited in Ker
v. California.5 4 The North Dakota statutes include express exceptions
that are included in the federal and California statutes only through
reference to the common law. The North Dakota statutes" refer to
the seizure of tangible evidence only, and it remains to be seen
whether that description will be interpreted to include intercepted
oral communications.
The federal wire tap statute authorizes the states to enact legislation allowing electronic surveillance and allowing the proper authorities to apply for and carry out that surveillance 6 North Dakota has
45. Id. Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1971), court-approved electronic eavesdropping by federal or state
law enforcement officers is permissible for specified offenses.
46. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
and things to be seized.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, quoted in note 7 supra.
48. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1974) ; id. § 19-03.1-32 (1971).
50. See State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 776 (N.D. 1973).
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1971).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970).
54. 377 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
55. N -.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1974) ; id. § 19-03.1-32 (1971).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (1970), provides:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting
attorney of any rolitical subdivision thereof, If such attorney is authorized
by a statute of that State to make application to a State court Judge of
competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception
of wire or oral communications, may apply to such judge for, and such judge
may grant in conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the
applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception
of wire or oral communications by investigative or law enforcement officers
having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the
application is made.
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no statute authorizing electronic surveillance and interception of oral
57
communications .
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized the variance
in the amount of constitutional protection against invasion of privacy
afforded differing classes of buildings.58 The reasonableness of any
search is measured by the nature of the building searched, balanced
against the methods used in the search. 59 It appears that an inhabited dwelling place is afforded the greatest degree of protection and
that such protection diminishes for a vacant outbuilding, depending
60
on its status as part of the curtilage.
Thus, it would not seem to be an unwarranted interpretation
of
the holding in Agrusa, given the constitution and statutes of North
Dakota, to speculate that it would be lawful in North Dakota, pursuant
to court authorization, to carry out an unannounced breaking and
entering of an uninhabited building, not within the curtilage, for the
purpose of securing evidence, which would almost certainly be destroyed prior to seizure were the owner of that building notified of the
impending search.
THOMAS L. TRENBEATH

57. North Dakota has, in fact, two statutes providing for penalties for unlawfully
intercepting communications and for doing business in the same. N.D. CENT. CODE §§
12.1-15-02 to 03 (1976).
58. State v. Manning, 134 N.W,2d 91 (N.D. 1965).
59. 1d. at 96.
60. Id.

